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Constraints on Legal Norms:
Kelsen's View in the Essays*
Stanley L. Paulsont
The last years of Hans Kelsen's life, between the publication
in 1967 of an English translation of his great and difficult work, the
Pure Theory of Law,I and his death in 1973,2 were marked by a flurry
of Kelsenite scholarship.3 For Anglo-American readers, the most
important new development was the publication in December of
1973 of a major collection of translations of Kelsen's papers, the
Hans Kelsen: Essays in Legal and Moral Philosophy.4 This volume
contains the first English translations of a number of Kelsen's note-
worthy papers on the natural law theory and all of his papers on the
logic of legal norms.5
* Hans Kelsen: Essays in Legal and Moral Philosophy. 0. WEINBERGER, ed., P. HEATH,
transl. Reidel Publishing Co., Boston, Mass. 1974. Pp. xxvii, 300. $36.00.
t Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Washington University (St. Louis). I am indebted
to a number of people for helpful suggestions and discussion. I especially want to thank
Bonnie Paulson and Carl Wellman.
I H. KELSEN, REINE RECHTSLEHRE (2d ed. 1960)[hereinafter cited as REiE REcHTSLEHRE].
The English translation (M. Knight transl. 1967) is incomplete and at some points inaccur-
ate; quotations in the text are my own translations from the REINE RECHTSLEHRE, and are cited
by section number rather than page number to facilitate reference to the English translation.
2 Among the Kelsen memoria see Akzin, Hans Kelsen-In Memoriam, 8 ISRAEL L. REv.
325 (1973); Gross, Hans Kelsen, 67 Am. J. INT'L L. 491 (1973); Verdross, Hans Kelsen in
memoriam, 24 OSTERREICHISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FOR 6FFENTLICHES RECHT 241 (1973).
1 In 1968 there appeared, in German, a monumental collection of the papers of Kelsen,
Adolf Merkl, and Alfred Verdross-a tribute to the prodigy of these theorists, the leading
figures in the Vienna School of Legal Philosophy. DIE WIENER RECHTSTHEORErISCHE SCHULE
(H. Klecatsky, et al., eds. 1968). This impressive compilation, in two volumes, includes forty-
five of Kelsen's major papers in legal philosophy. In 1969, Kelsen's long-time bibliographer
and friend, Rudolf M6tall, published the first Kelsen biography. R. MErALL, HANS KELSEN:
LEBEN UND WERK (1969). The appendices to M~tall's biography include the most recent of
his Kelsen bibliographies. In 1971, the year of Kelsen's ninetieth birthday, two new
Festschriften appeared: FEsTScHRIFT FOR HANS KELSEN ZUM 90. GEBURTSTAG (A. Merkl, et al.,
eds. 1971) (which contains a supplementary bibliography compiled by M6tall) and A Tribute
to Hans Kelsen, 59 CALIF. L. Rzv. 609-872 (1971).
(0. Weinberger ed., P. Heath transl. 1973) [hereinafter cited as ESSAYS].
On natural law, morality, and related themes (with date of first publication): God and
the State (1923), The Idea of Natural Law (1928), State-Form and World-Outlook (1933),
What is Justice? (1953), Norm and Value (1960), Law and Morality (1960), and The Founda-
tions of the Theory of Natural Law (1963). On the logic of legal norms: Derogation (1962),
On the Concept of Norm (1965), Law and Logic (1965), Law and Logic Again. On the Applica-
bility of Logical Principles to Legal Norms (1967), and On the Practical Syllogism (1968).
Three of these papers have appeared previously in English. A different English version of
What is Justice?, based on Kelsen's 1952 valedictory lecture at the University of California
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Kelsen's views on natural law are widely known. Contending
that the natural law theorist conflates the amoral "ought" of the
positive or enacted law with the moral "ought" of the natural law,
Kelsen argued in a number of his writings that the legal "ought" is
to be sharply distinguished from the moral "ought". Kelsen's work
on the logic of legal norms, on the other hand, is a new undertaking.
He did not begin writing papers on questions of legal norms until
the 1960s. These investigations on norms, first published in Euro-
pean periodicals and Festschriften but largely unnoticed in England
and America,' are important not only as a late development in
Kelsen's thought and as a contribution to the resolution of concep-
tual problems in the developing field of deontic logic, 7 but also as
an extreme statement of legal positivism.
No review of this length could deal systematically with the full
import of the Essays. This discussion focuses on the role of con-
straints on legal norms, a pervasive theme in Kelsen's earlier work
that is raised anew in the Essays. Part I describes the kinds of
constraints with which Kelsen is concerned. Part II examines the
doctrines of legal validity and the legal proposition, both of which
underlie Kelsen's views on constraints. Finally, Parts Inl and IV
analyze Kelsen's views on constraints and raise certain difficulties
of a logical nature that are generated by Kelsen's defense of these
views.
I. CONSTRAINTS ON LEGAL NORMS
Constraints that limit the possible "substance" or "content" of
legal norms might be termed substantive constraints. A familiar
at Berkeley, appeared in H. KELSEN, WHAT IS JUSTICE? 1-24, 376-78 (1957). Derogation (K.
Buschmann transl.) is reprinted, without change, from ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ROSCOE POUND
339-55 (R. Newman ed. 1962); there is no published German version. Norm and Value (M.
Knight transl.) is reprinted, without change, from 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1624-29 (1966), which,
in turn, is a translation of REINE RECHTSLEHRE § 4(e). A shortened English version of a fourth
paper, Law and Logic, appeared, with minor textual changes, in PHILOSOPHY AND CHIuSTIAN-
rY: PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS DEDICATED TO PROFESSOR DR. HERMAN DOOYEWEERD 231-36 (1965).
The ESSAYS also includes two papers on causality: The Emergence of the Causal Law from
the Principle of Retribution (1939) and Causality and Accounting (1960). Each, in several
different translations, has appeared previously in English.
' But see Hart, Kelsen's Doctrine of the Unity of Law, in ETHICS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 171,
182-90 (H. Kiefer & M. Munitz eds. 1968); Munzer, Validity and Legal Conflicts, 82 YALE
L.J. 1140, 1162-68 (1973). Both Hart and Munzer allude to Kelsen's paper on Derogation,
ESSAYS at 261-75.
1 See generally the pioneering work of G.H. von Wright, including Deontic Logic, 60
MIND 1 (1951), reprinted in LOGICAL STUDIES 58-74 (1957); NORM AND ACTION (1963); AN ESSAY
IN DEONTIC LOGIC AND THE GENERAL THEORY OF AcTION (1968); On the Logic and Ontology of
Norms, in PHILOSOPHICAL LOGIC 89-107 (J. Davis, et al., eds. 1969).
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example of a substantive constraint is the recent appeal to the doc-
trine of privacy to prevent lawmakers from prohibiting the use of
artificial contraceptives. 8
Some substantive constraints are merely contingent, that is,
they may or may not exist in a legal system, while others appear to
be inherent in any legal system. Privacy, for example, has evolved
as a doctrine of constitutional stature only in the last decade; it is
conceivable, though unlikely, that the doctrine might be abrogated.
But abrogation is inconceivable in the case of, say, criminal law
norms prohibiting killing or other forms of extreme violence to the
person. This difference between the privacy doctrine and criminal
law norms prohibiting killing marks an important distinction be-
tween what might be termed nonsystemic and systemic substantive
constraints. Unlike the privacy doctrine, which as a nonsystemic
constraint may be peculiar to one jurisdiction, norms prohibiting
extreme violence to the person are found in every legal order. Is
there a philosophical explanation of the systemic character of the
latter? Can it be shown why prohibitions on killing are the rule, why
permissions to kill (as in self-defense) are exceptions, and why man-
dates to kill (as in a state execution) are limited to altogether ex-
traordinary contexts?
Natural law theories have explained the systemic character of
these constraints in terms of a teleological theory of human nature.
The teleological theory develops the thesis that a man's nature im-
pels him toward certain goals or ends. In its traditional form, the
theory is a part of a more fundamental theory of morals or theology.'
In a more modern form, however, the teleological theory rests not
on morals or theology but on the truth of general empirical claims
to the effect that man exhibits certain regularities in the goals he
chooses.10 In both forms of the theory, constraints on the content of
legal norms are necessary to achieve these goals or ends-most ob-
viously, self-preservation.
Kelsen, while recognizing a variety of nonsystemic constraints
on the content of legal norms, denies the existence of systemic con-
straints on content. The rejection is part of his polemic against the
natural law theory.
According to the natural law theory, a positive law is valid
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
See, e.g., The Idea of Natural Law, ESSAYS at 27-60; and The Foundations of the Theory
of Natural Law, id. at 114-53, for interpretations of substantive constraints as implications
of the natural law theorist's theology. See also text at notes 50-60 infra.
11 See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAw 189-95 (1961).
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because its content conforms to the natural law qua norm of
absolute justice. According to the Pure Theory of Law as a
positivistic legal theory, the validity of positive law is alto-
gether independent of its content; a positive law is valid not
because it has a definite, namely a just content, but because
it was created in a particular way. .... .
But if Kelsen's argument for rejecting the systemic substantive
constraints of the natural law theory proves anything, it proves too
much. By severing the link between natural law precept and indi-
vidual norm Kelsen unwittingly severs the link between authorizing
norm and individual norm in his own theory as well.1 2
Kelsen's attack on natural law raises a second issue. If a posi-
tive law is valid solely because it has been authorized, then two
conflicting norms may exist simultaneously. If, for example, norm
A commands Jones to do act x at time t and norm B prohibits Jones
from doing act x at time t, then although the norms have the same
material elements (subject, act, and time), they are of distinct
"normative modalities"; the first is a command, the second a pro-
hibition.13 They present, in virtue of their form alone, an express
conflict, 4 for the subject's noncompliance with one of the norms is
unavoidable.
The problem of expressly conflicting norms might be resolved
by invoking a second type of constraint, the constraint on form.
While substantive constraints limit the possible content of legal
norms, constraints on form limit the possible combinations of legal
norms. Like substantive constraints, constraints on form may be in
" Kelsen, Voin Geltungsgrund des Rechts [On the Basis of Legal Validity], in
VOLKERRECHT UND RECHTLICHES WELTBILD: FESTSCHRIFT FOR ALFRED VERDROSS 157, 165 (F. von
der Heydte, et al., eds. 1960), reprinted in 2 DiE IENER RECHTSTHEORErISCHE SCHULE 1417,
1427 (H. Klecatsky, et al., eds. 1968)(my translation).
" See text at notes 59-60 infra.
,3 Normative modalities include what Kelsen speaks of as "norms" and also as "norma-
tive functions," namely, "to command" (gebieten), "to permit" (erlauben), and "to author-
ize" (ermlchtigen). See REINE REcHTSLEHRE §§ 4(b), (d). For the sake of convenience the
prohibition is included here as a normative modality although strictly speaking it may be
defined in terms of the command and the notion of forbearance; see, e.g., G.H. voN WRIOrHT,
NORM AND ACTION ch. 5 (1963). Kelsen introduces another norm or normative function,
namely, "to derogate" (derogieren), in his paper on Derogation, EssAYs at 261. The derogating
norm, which is not considered here, raises special problems, for it represents a significant
departure from Kelsen's conception of the legal norm as developed through the commanding,
permitting, and authorizing norms.
11 The least problematic case of an express conflict between norms, that between a
command and a prohibition, is used here to illustrate the role of systemic constraints on form.
For discussion of other, more problematic conflicts between norms, see Derogation, ESSAYS
at 269-71; Munzer, Validity and Legal Conflicts, 82 YALE L. J. 1140, 1142-48 (1973).
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principle either nonsystemic and ad hoc or systemic and inherent
in any legal system. The rule lex posterior derogat priori is a familiar
nonsystemic constraint on form, which resolves conflicts by deny-
ing validity to the norm first enacted. The rule is either expressly
enacted like other positive legal norms or simply followed as a mat-
ter of custom. But it need not be invoked on a given occasion and
in fact may not be recognized in the jurisdiction at all.
It may be asked whether constraints on form, like substantive
constraints concerning, for example, extreme violence, are in fact
found in every legal order. Can express conflicts be resolved in terms
of systemic features of the norms themselves? For example, might
the principle of noncontradiction, which applies to a conjunction of
statements that affirm and deny the same proposition, also provide
a systemic basis for resolving the problem of expressly conflicting
norms?
In the Pure Theory of Law (2d ed. 1960), Kelsen invokes the
principle of noncontradiction to make a case for one type of systemic
constraint on form, although he has abandoned this position in his
recent papers on the logic of legal norms in the Essays. The shift is
noteworthy as a development of legal positivism, and it invites at-
tention to both the earlier and the later of Kelsen's positions. Al-
though the arguments for Kelsen's earlier position are unsound, as
he himself recognized in the Essays,'5 in developing these arguments
Kelsen has provided a good part of the conceptual rigging necessary
for a defensible theory of legal validity-a theory that would pro-
vide, inter alia, a structure for both systemic and nonsystemic
constraints. Furthermore, if it is true that lawyers and laymen alike
subscribe to some ill-articulated version of Austinian legal positiv-
ism, 6 and if, as I believe, Kelsen's Pure Theory of Law is the most
elegant theoretical statement of such views, then an examination of
Kelsen's theory may speak to some of our own intuitions about law.
II. FUNDAMENTAL INTUITIVE NOTIONS OF LEGAL POSITIVISM
Legal positivism takes as its point of departure the idea that
law is conventional, "a human creation, [which] as such presents
itself purely as the work of man." 7 Natural law theory, on the other
" See text at notes 65-68 infra.
" Ronald Dworkin, among others, suggests that as a conceptual picture of law, the legal
positivism of John Austin is "accepted in one form or another by most working and academic
lawyers who hold views on jurisprudence." Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CH. L. REV.
14, 17 (1967), reprinted under the title Is Law a System of Rules?, in EssAYs IN LEGAL
PHILOSoPHY 25, 28 (R. Summers ed. 1968).
"7 The Idea of Natural Law, ESSAYS at 30.
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hand, holds that law "does not rest on a human and therefore inade-
quate will . ..but comes about 'on its own', so to speak."' 8 As
theories of the nature of law, legal positivism and natural law ex-
haust the field-the one, in the words of Lord Bryce, perceiving law
as "Artificial, Transitory, and Local" and the other perceiving law
as "Natural, Permanent, and Universal."19
One of the fundamental intuitive notions of legal positivism is
human will. "From the standpoint of a moral or legal positivism,
account is taken only of positive norms, i.e., those posited by real
acts of will, and, so far as only man can have a will, of norms posited
only by actual human acts of will."2
The second fundamental notion is coercion. Kelsen explains
that laws are "posited by human acts of will" and have, therefore,
"an arbitrary character. Any behaviour we please, that is, can be
decreed in them to be obligatory."'" But if positive laws are arbitrary
and may therefore be unjust, nothing inherent in positive law as-
sures compliance. For this reason "coercion [is] an indispensable
constituent of positive law. '22
Kelsen develops the fundamental notions of coercion and
human will in two different domains-the positive legal order (die
positive Rechtsordnung) and legal science (Rechtswissenschaft). In
the positive legal order, coercion is manifested in the legal sanction,
and acts of human will "create" or "posit" legal norms.2 3 In legal
science, the role of the sanction in the positive legal order is charac-
terized by the legal proposition, and the necessary conditions for
legal norms are set out in the doctrine of legal validity.
A. The Legal Proposition
The systematic development of the intuitive notion of coercion
presents a problem for Kelsen. Coercion is manifested only in the
sanction, and the legal norm obscures the role of coercion in the
positive legal order. The legal norm in its most familiar form is a
command, for example:
Jones must do act x at time t.
But the command itself does not express a sanction. To fill the
gap, Kelsen formulates what he terms the legal proposition
Id. at 28-29.
" 2 J. BRYCE, STUDIES IN HISTORY AND JURISPRUDENCE 565 (1901).
On the Concept of Norm, ESSAYS at 218.
21 Id.
21 The Idea of Natural Law, ESSAYS at 32.
', Kelsen, Vom Geltungsgrund des Rechts, note 11 supra, at 158.
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(Rechtssatz) .24 For example, the legal proposition corresponding to
the aforementioned norm would read:
If Jones fails to do x at t, then 0, a legal official, ought to
impose on Jones a certain legal sanction.
The legal proposition is hypothetical in form; satisfaction of the
condition specified in the protasis ("if" clause) warrants the legal
result specified in the apodosis ("then" clause). (The legal result,
strictly speaking, consists in "imputing" [zurechnen] liability to
the subject, that is, rendering the subject liable to the sanction
where he was formerly immune.)2
Some of the differences between legal norms and legal proposi-
tions are clear. Norms speak directly to the obligations of legal
subjects, prescribing a course of behavior; legal propositions are
concerned with the situation in which a subject fails to follow these
prescriptions. Norms are created by legal officials (and by private
individuals through consensual arrangements), while legal proposi-
tions are the constructions of legal theorists. Norms are valid or
invalid; legal propositions are true or false.
But the nature of the relationship between legal norms and
legal propositions is problematic. In his voluminous writings, Kel-
sen addresses the question with a bewildering variety of statements.
In the Pure Theory of Law (2d ed. 1960), he speaks of the legal
proposition as "describing the norm, '26 and earlier, in a paper, as
"describing the 'ought' of the legal norm. ' 2 In the General Theory
of Law and State (1945), he says that the legal proposition "repre-
sents" the legal norm and, in metaphorical language familiar from
Kant's doctrine of analyticity, that the legal norm is "contained in"
the legal proposition. 2 These cryptic statements are unhelpful, and
the question of the nature of the relationship between legal norm
and legal proposition persists.
11 The translator of the ESSAYS renders Kelsen's term "Rechtssatz" as "legal statement,"
whereas it is rendered here as "legal proposition," thus facilitating the distinction drawn
between Rechtssatze (legal propositions) and Aussagen (statements); see text at notes 64-65
infra. Both translations reflect the fact that for Kelsen, Rechtssatze are descriptive, not
normative; earlier translations of Kelsen's "Rechtssatz" as "rule of law" obliterated this
critical distinction. See Kelsen's own discussion of the meaning of "Rechtssatz" in Kelsen,
Professor Stone and the Pure Theory of Law, 17 STAN. L. REV. 1128, 1132-37 (1965). See also
Woozley, Legal Duties, Offences, and Sanctions, 77 MIND 461, 461-62 n.1 (1968).
25 See REINE RECHTSLEHRE §§ 16-18. See also Moore, Kelsen's Puzzling "Descriptive
Ought", 20 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 1269 (1973).
26 REINE RECHTSLEHRE § 16.
2 Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law and Analytical Jurisprudence, 55 HARv. L. REV. 44,
51 (1941).
2 H. KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 45, 61 (A. Wedberg transl. 1945).
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Kelsen addresses the question more precisely in a paper in-
cluded in the Essays on "The Idea of Natural Law." Speaking of a
norm of the form, "I ought, or am obligated, not to steal," Kelsen
says that it "means [bedeuten] in positive law nothing else but
that if I steal, I ought to be punished, if I fail to repay a loan
received, there should be execution against me. '29 Similarly, albeit
in briefer compass, Kelsen remarks in the Pure Theory of Law (2d
ed. 1960) that to say "[t]hat behavior is commanded means
[bedeuten] that the opposite course of behavior is the condition of
a sanction that 'ought' to be imposed."3 Now Kelsen is not suggest-
ing here that the meaning of the "ought" of the legal norm is cap-
tured by the "ought" in the legal proposition. For the former stands
for the will of the law-creating agent and can be represented var-
iously by a command, a permission, or an authorization. The
"ought" of the legal norm is thus a generic term. 3' By contrast, the
"ought" of the legal proposition means simply that where the condi-
tion specified by the "if"-clause is satisfied, liability to the sanction
of the "then"-clause is "imputed" to the individual. 2
Rather, Kelsen is saying that the norm is equivalent to the legal
proposition. The equivalence of legal norm and legal proposition
shall be understood, here, to mean that the legal norm is valid if,
and only if, the corresponding legal proposition is true.33 For exam-
ple,
The command "Subject S must do act x at time t" is valid if,
and only if, the legal proposition "If S fails to do x at t, then
0, a legal official, ought to impose on S a certain legal sanc-
tion" is true.
The view that the norm and the legal proposition are equivalent
has important consequences with respect to Kelsen's arguments on
systemic constraints on form.
B. The Doctrine of Legal Validity
Kelsen discusses human will, the other of the fundamental in-
2, The Idea of Natural Law, ESSAYS at 32-33.
10 REINE RECHTSLEHRE § 5(a).
11 See text at notes 36-38 infra.
32 See note 25 supra.
1 See text at notes 64-65 infra. The notion of equivalence applies directly to "indepen-
dent norms," that is, commands (and prohibitions, see note 13 supra), to which the discussion
in Part IV is confined. The notion does not, however, apply directly to "dependent norms,"
that is, permissions and authorizations; their relation to legal propositions is complex and
cannot be understood apart from the command on which the permission or authorization
depends. See REINE RECHTSLEHRE § 6(e).
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tuitive notions of legal positivism, as it is expressed in the acts of
individuals, and specifically, in those acts intended to affect the
behavior of others. Because the act of an individual is ascertainable
in both space and time and is governed by causal laws, Kelsen
speaks of its existence as "the existence of a natural fact."3 His
concern, however, is not with the act qua fact, but with its meaning:
If through some act an individual expresses his intention that
another individual is to behave in a particular way . . . the
meaning of his act cannot be accounted for by saying that the
other individual will behave in the prescribed way, but only by
saying that he ought [solien] so to behave. 31
The "ought" in "ought so to behave" is, in Kelsen's view, the
first step in an account of the meaning of the individual's act. But
"ought" (sollen) has a Pickwickian use in the Pure Theory. 6 The
conventional vocabulary of ethics confines the meaning of the verbal
auxiliary "ought" to the single normative modality of command.
Kelsen, however, uses "ought" as a generic term ranging over the
specific normative operators ("must," "may," and "can") of the
specific normative modalities (command, permission, and authori-
zation, respectively) .7 Corresponding to the generic "ought" is the
substantive expression "prescription" (and also "to prescribe"),
which ranges over the substantives of the specific normative modali-
ties.3 1
In some cases the meaning of the generic "ought" is, in Kelsen's
language, merely "subjective"-the intention of a party issuing a
prescription. In other cases the generic "ought" also has, for Kelsen,
an "objective" meaning independent of the prescribing party's in-
tention.39 The difference between subjective and objective meaning
is illustrated by the contrast between "the command of a gangster
to give [someone] a certain sum of money and the command of a
tax officer which has the same subjective meaning as the former."4
Although these prescriptions have the same subjective meaning, the
31 Kelsen, On the Basic Norm, 47 CALIF. L. REV. 107 (1959).
REINE RECHTSLEHRE § 4(b).
" See id. at § 4(b)-(c).
See note 13 supra.
's This discussion follows Kelsen's practice of using the generic "ought" (as well as
"prescription" and "to prescribe") to talk indifferently about the specific normative modali-
ties. See, e.g., On the Concept of Norm, ESSAYS at 216, where, after alluding to the specific
normative modalities, Kelsen speaks generically of norms "as prescriptions [Vorschriften]
for the mutual behaviour of men."
19 See RErNE RECHTSLEHRE § 4(b).
10 Kelsen, On the Pure Theory of Law, 1 ISRAEL L. REv. 1, 6 (1966).
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command of the tax officer has, in addition, an objective meaning.
Kelsen speaks of the objective meaning of a generic "ought," or
prescription, as a norm, "a specific sense-content whose verbal ex-
pression is an ought-statement."' And the validity of a norm is
simply its existence in a normative order.42
But it is difficult to distinguish legal norms from prescriptions
that have only subjective meaning. Kelsen sees the resolution of this
problem as an important task for the Pure Theory. 3 His solution is
the doctrine of legal validity, which provides conditions for deter-
mining the validity of legal norms. Although these conditions are to
be found, in the first instance, in the positive legal order, their
complete statement in the doctrine of legal validity includes two
analytical constructions of legal science: first, the concept of author-
ization in a normative hierarchy and, second, the concept of the
basic norm.
1. Authorization in a Normative Hierarchy. The central idea
in the doctrine of legal validity is authorization. The authorizing
norm confers power on a particular person or determinate body to
create law and specifies the conditions for exercising that power.4
Thus, a given norm is identified as legally valid by appeal to its
authorizing norm. The authorizing norm, itself a positive legal
norm, is similarly identified as legally valid by appeal to its author-
izing norm. One determines legal validity in this manner whenever
positive legal norms exist on immediately adjacent levels in the
normative hierarchy.
Suppose, for example, that the legal validity of a criminal sent-
ence, an execution by hanging, is in question. 5 The act may be
murder or the terminus of a legal proceeding. It is the latter, Kelsen
argues, only if the execution is authorized by an individual legal
norm, namely a court order. The court order, in turn, is legally valid
only if it is within the scope of the general power-conferring norm
that authorizes such orders by the court. And the general power-
conferring norm is, in turn, legally valid only if it has been created
by a legislative body authorized by the constitution to enact general
power-conferring norms.
2. The Basic Norm. The identification of legal norms by ap-
" The Foundations of the Theory of Natural Law, EssAYs at 114.
42 See REINE RECHTSLEHRE § 4(c).
See id. at §§ 4(b)-(c), 6(c), 34(a)-(d); Kelsen, Professor Stone and the Pure Theory of
Law, 17 STAN. L. REV. 1128, 1144 (1965).
1 See REINE RECHTSLERRE § 34(c).
45 Id.
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peal to their authorizing norms cannot, however, go on intermina-
bly. For at some point one arrives at the "historically first constitu-
tion" beyond which there are by hypothesis no further authorizing
norms in the positive legal order. At this point Kelsen shifts ground,
moving from the enacted norms of the positive order to the presup-
posed basic norm, a construction of legal science.
Kelsen states:
If one. . . inquires into the basis of the validity of a historically
first constitution . . .and foregoes any answer in terms of a
meta-legal authority, such as God or nature, then the answer
can only be that the validity of this constitution, the assump-
tion that it is a binding norm, must be presupposed.46
Although there is no consensus on what Kelsen means by the basic
norm, the Kantian influence is clear. Kelsen says repeatedly that
the basic norm is, in the Kantian sense, a transcendental concept.
Just as Kant asks how, apart from metaphysics, it is possible to
interpret the synthetic a priori propositions of natural science, "so
likewise, the Pure Theory of Law asks: How, apart from a metalegal
authority such as God or nature, is it possible to interpret the
subjective sense of certain acts as a system of objectively valid
norms?"4 7
The concept of authorization in a normative hierarchy and the
concept of the basic norm lie at the core of Kelsen's doctrine of legal
validity. There is, however, an additional condition of legal validity,
that of efficacy. Kelsen defines an efficacious norm as one that is
either complied with by the subject or, in the absence of
compliance, is "applied" (anwenden) by a legal official's imposition
of the sanction." An occasional lapse in the efficacy of a norm does
not undermine the validity of the norm, but a complete- loss of
efficacy does. Legal norms, Kelsen contends, "are no longer consid-
ered valid if they cease to be efficacious." 9
Kelsen thus sees the doctrine of legal validity as an analytical
doctrine of legal science, a complete statement of the conditions for
the legal validity of norms. To summarize:
46 Id.
4' Id. at § 34(d).
1' Id. at § 4(c).
11 Id. at § 34(g). The requirement expressed here, that the efficacy of the individual legal
norm is a necessary condition of the validity of that norm, is stronger than that which Kelsen
espouses in the earlier GENERAL THEORY OF LAw AND STATE (A. Wedberg transl. 1945). There
he holds only that the efficacy of the normative legal order is a necessary condition of the
validity of individual legal norms within that order. See id. at 41-42, 118-20, 122.
[42:768
Constraints on Legal Norms
A norm is legally valid if and only if (1) it has been created in
accordance with the conditions specified by its authorizing
norm, and the authorizing norm has, in turn, been created in
accordance with the conditions specified by its authorizing
norm, and so on, for each level of authorizing norms in the
hierarchy; and (2) the norm is generally efficacious.
The further condition that the basic norm be presupposed is not
included in this statement of the conditions of validity, because the
presupposition is implicit whenever a norm is identified by appeal
to its authorizing norm.
Kelsen's doctrine of legal validity is, in the end, a doctrine of
the creation of norms. In sharp contrast, the doctrine of legal valid-
ity in the natural law theory rests on an appeal to systemic substan-
tive constraints, which cannot be created or abrogated in an ad hoc
manner but rather are inherent in any legal system.
III. SYSTEMIC SUBSTANTIVE CONSTRAINTS AND LEGAL NORMS
Kelsen prepares the way for his rejection of the putative exist-
ence of systemic substantive constraints by distinguishing between
two models for a normative order, the dynamic and the static." To
determine the legal validity of a norm N in a dynamic normative
order, one looks to the authorizing norm that confers the power in
accordance with which N was created, and then, to the norm that
confers the power in accordance with which the authorizing norm
was created, and so on. Details of the dynamic model are familiar
from Kelsen's doctrine of legal validity." To determine the validity
of N in a static normative order, one must ascertain whether N is
deducible from higher order norms and, ultimately, from the pre-
supposed basic norm. All of the norms of a static normative order
"are already contained in the content of the presupposed norm, and
they can therefore be deduced from it by way of a logical operation,
that of a conclusion from the general to the specific. '5 2
According to Kelsen, the normative order of natural law follows
the static model. He supposes that by rejecting the static model he
has rejected, as well, the systemic substantive constraints of the
natural law theory. In a statement reflecting his moral relativism, 53
Kelsen contends that "there cannot be any self-evident norms of
See REINE RECHTSLEHRE § 34(b).
5, See text at notes 43-49 supra.
52 REINE RECHTSLEHRE § 34(b).
See, on Kelsen's moral relativism, What is Justice?, EssAYs at 1-26.
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human behavior" from which legal norms could be deduced. 4 In his
paper on "The Idea of Natural Law," however, Kelsen offers a more
instructive explanation for his rejection of the systemic substantive
constraints of the natural law theory. Here Kelsen argues that even
if the content of certain norms in a static system were self-evident
and even if other norms could be deduced therefrom, nevertheless
deducibility would be irrelevant to the validity of norms. It follows,
Kelsen would have us believe, that self-evident norms will not serve
as systemic substantive constraints on norms of the positive or en-
acted law.
To illustrate Kelsen's argument it is useful to look at a natural
law theorist's example of deducibility within a normative order. In
the Summa Theologica, St. Thomas Aquinas argues that there are
two ways of deriving a command from a natural law precept. The
first of these is deduction (demonstratio):
• . . commands can be traced to natural law in two ways; one,
drawn deductively like conclusions from premises . . . [and
this] process is like that of the sciences where inferences are
demonstratively drawn from principles ....
To apply [this first process] some commands are drawn
like conclusions from natural law, for instance, "you must not
commit murder" can be inferred from "you must do harm to
nobody."5
Aquinas' example of the derivation of a command from a precept
of the natural law by deduction is, strictly speaking, enthymematic.
That is, if the example represents a logically correct argument, it is
a truncated one, for a premise has been omitted. But the omission
is innocuous, if the premise in question, "Murder is a form of
harm," may be understood as a definition, contributing nothing of
substantive import. The addition of the omitted definitional prem-
ise then yields the following logically correct argument:
You must do harm to nobody.
Murder is a form of harm.
Ergo: You must not commit murder.
'4 REINE RECHTSLEHRE § 34(j).
St. Thomas Aquinas, SUMMA THEOLOGICA q. XCV, art. 2 (T. Gilby transl. 1966). (Aqui-
nas' "second way" of deriving a command from a natural law is determination
[determinatio]. See id.) Aquinas' "first way" provides an example of deducibility within a
normative order. But as Aquinas' theory of "practical reason" makes abundantly clear, it
would be a mistake to suppose that he is a "deductivist" who would subscribe to the tenets
of Kelsen's static model. See id. at q. XCIV, art. 4. See also Ross, Justice is Reasonableness:
Aquinas on Human Law and Morality, 58 MONIsT 86 (1974).
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Although Kelsen refers to the conclusion of Aquinas' deduction
as a general legal norm, Kelsen's argument turns on the hypotheti-
cal structure of that norm. In effect, Kelsen translates the norm into
the equivalent legal proposition. For example, he interprets the
command, "You must not commit murder" in terms of the legal
proposition, "If you commit murder, then 0, a legal official, ought
to impose on you a certain legal sanction." Kelsen's argument ex-
ploits the idea that to instantiate the hypothetical, to "individual-
ize" the general legal norm by applying it to a named person, in-
volves an exercise of human will. This interposition of an act of will
into what purports to be a purely logical operation severs Aquinas'
deductive link at two points. The protasis of the hypothetical gives
expression to what Kelsen terms "a specific condition," and the
apodosis, to "a specific consequence,""6 and each marks a point at
which Kelsen speaks of an act of individualization. Consideration
of the protasis alone is sufficient to demonstrate the argument.
The act of individualizing the protasis of the general norm
"consists in establishing the actual existence ('in reality') of a cir-
cumstance laid down in the general norm as the condition of a
consequence.'57 Application of Aquinas' norm requires demonstrat-
ing the satisfaction of the condition specified in the protasis, namely
murder, by showing that, for example, a named individual Jones,
acting with the requisite mental attitude, took the life of another
person. But satisfaction of the protasis, Kelsen continues, is not
something that can be established by the "purely logical function
of subsuming an instance under a universal. 5 8 Whether acts of a
certain class can be logically deduced or subsumed is irrelevant;
what is critical, Kelsen contends, is that a particular act is puta-
tively subsumed. Although a particular act a may not in reality be
subsumable under the condition specified in the protasis of the
general norm, if the appropriate legal official declares it subsuma-
ble, then for legal purposes it is. If act a is in reality subsumable,
but the legal official declares that it is not, then for legal purposes
it is not. 9 Again, what is critical for Kelsen is not subsumability,
but the act of putative subsumption.
But if this argument proves anything about systemic substan-
tive constraints, it proves too much. The very consideration that
Kelsen brings to bear on this issue-that the actions of the legal
" The Idea of Natural Law, EssAYs at 41.
' Id.
Id. at 42.
, Id. at 47.
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official are decisive-applies with equal force to the doctrine of
legal validity in the Pure Theory. That is, if the act of individuali-
zation severs the deductive link in Aquinas' argument, it also severs
the link between authorizing norm and individual norm in Kelsen's
own doctrine of legal validity. One might argue that although a legal
official's act may not be within the scope of the authorizing norm,
if the official nevertheless declares that it is, then for legal purposes
it is. So, the argument goes too far and, in fact, generates legal
realism-the view, roughly, that the law is what officials say and
do. And the problems with that view have been aired by, among
others, Kelsen himself.6"
Kelsen's effort to reject the systemic substantive constraints of
the natural law theory comes as no surprise, for it is a central tenet
of legal positivism that law may have any content whatever. Cu-
riously, however, until very recently Kelsen accepted systemic con-
straints on form, which he used in an attempt to resolve express
conflicts between norms in the extraordinary case.
IV. CONSTRAINTS ON THE FORM OF LEGAL NORMS
Kelsen suggests that express conflicts between norms are re-
solved in the ordinary case by employing one or another of a variety
of familiar nonsystemic or ad hoc rules and institutionalized prac-
tices. For example, an express conflict between norms enacted at
different times, either by the same legal organ or different legal
organs having the same competence, may be resolved by invoking
the rule lex posterior derogat priori.6 If the express conflict is be-
tween simultaneously enacted norms, which precludes application
of the rule lex posterior derogat priori, legal officials may have dis-
cretionary power to choose one norm over the other, or they may
resolve the conflict by interpretation.
But sometimes no resolution of the conflict by recourse to non-
systemic rules or practices may be forthcoming. Must the conflict
stand if two norms, enacted at the same time, present an express
conflict that legal officials are unable or unwilling to resolve by
choice or interpretation? In the Pure Theory of Law (2d ed. 1960),
Kelsen argues that in reality no conflict exists, for in a putative
conflict one of the apparently conflicting norms is invalid.6 2 The
60 See, e.g., Kelsen, Eine "Realistische" und die Reine Rechtslehre [A "Realistic"
Theory of Law and the Pure Theory of Law], 10 OSTERR, ZEITSCHR. F. 6FFENTL. REcHT 1 (1959).
See also Hart, Scandinavian Realism, [1959] CAMB. L.J. 233.
11 See REINE RECHTSLEHRE § 34(e).
12 See generally id. at §§ 16, 34(e); Kelsen, What is the Pure Theory of Law?, 34 TuL. L.
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argument turns on Kelsen's peculiar use of the principle of noncon-
tradiction.
The predicates "true" and "false" apply only to statements (or
propositions). The principle of noncontradiction presupposes the
applicability of these predicates and hence governs only statements
(or propositions). Given two statements, in which the second
("Jones is not rich") denies exactly what the first asserts ("Jones is
rich"), their conjunction is a self-contradiction-that is, the con-
junction is always false. If the first statement is true, it implies the
falsity of the second; and if the first statement is false, it implies
the truth of the second. Applying the principle of noncontradiction
directly to norms, in order to show that conflicting norms may stand
in the same relationship to one another as conflicting statements,
presupposes the applicability of the predicates "true" and "false"
to norms. But as Kelsen himself points out repeatedly, a norm is
neither true nor false but rather valid or invalid.63
If Kelsen were in fact attempting to apply the principle of non-
contradiction directly to norms, the distinction between truth and
validity would be enough to undermine his effort. But Kelsen is
looking instead to an indirect or per analogiam application of the
principle. When two norms appear expressly to conflict, a denial of
legal validity to one of the norms is logically implied, in Kelsen's
view, because the conjunction of certain statements corresponding
to the norms is a self-contradiction. Kelsen writes:
A norm is neither true nor false but rather, valid or invalid.
What can be true or false, however, is a statement [Aussage],
one that describes a normative order by asserting that accord-
ing to this order a certain norm is valid-and, in particular, a
legal proposition [Rechtssatz] that describes a legal order by
asserting that according to this order a certain sanction ought
or ought not, under certain conditions, to be imposed. Logical
principles in general and the principle of noncontradiction in
particular are applicable to legal propositions [Rechtssidtze]
that describe legal norms and are, therefore, indirectly applica-
ble to the legal norms themselves. It is thus not at all absurd
to assert that two legal norms "contradict" one another. And
therefore only one of the two can be regarded as objectively
valid. 4
REV. 269, 271 (1960); Kelsen, Der Begriff der Rechtsordnung [The Concept of the Legal
Order], 1 LOGIQUE Er ANALYSE 150, 155 (1958), in 2 DIE WIENER RECHTSTHEOREISCHE SCHULE
1395, 1401 (H. Klecatsky, et al., eds. 1968).
,3 See, e.g., Kelsen, What is the Pure Theory of Law?, 34 TuL. L. REV. 269, 271 (1960).
'3 REINE RECHTSLEHRE § 34(e) (emphasis added).
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Kelsen begins his argument by considering the legal proposi-
tions (Rechtssatze) that correspond to the expressly conflicting
norms. Suppose, for example, that norm A is a command that Jones
do act x at time t and that norm B is a prohibition, directing Jones
to forbear from doing x to t. To all appearances the norms present
an express conflict. The corresponding legal propositions, equiva-
lent to norms A and B respectively, are:
1. If S, a legal subject, fails to do x at t, then 0, a legal
official, ought to impose on S a certain legal sanction.
2. If S does x at t, then 0 ought to impose on S a certain legal
sanction.
Kelsen argues that where norms A and B appear to present an
express conflict, one or the other is invalid because the conjunction
of legal propositions 1 and 2 is a self-contradiction. But the argu-
ment clearly will not do. A situation in which a legal subject is liable
to a sanction whether or not he does x at t is anomalous to be sure,
but an anomaly is not a self-contradiction. The conjunction of the
legal propositions corresponding to expressly conflicting norms does
not provide a reason for denying validity to one or the other of the
norms.
Although Kelsen applies his argument only to legal proposi-
tions and not to the statements (Aussagen) used to assert that
norms are valid or invalid, such statements present a parallel case
for Kelsen's argument. Suppose, as before, that norm A is a com-
mand that Jones do act x at time t and that norm B is a prohibition,
bidding Jones to forbear from doing x at t. The statements (or, as
expressed here, the statement-forms) used to assert that these
norms are valid or invalid are:
1. Norm A is valid/invalid in this legal order.
2. Norm B is valid/invalid in this legal order.
Thus, where norms A and B appear to present an express conflict,
one or the other is invalid because the conjunction of statements 1.
and 2. is a self-contradiction.
Not surprisingly, the application of Kelsen's argument to state-
ments fares no better than its application to propositions. Regard-
less of how the predicates "valid" and "invalid" are assigned to
norms A and B, the conjunction of the corresponding statements 1.
and 2. is not self-contradictory. Statements 1. and 2. are used to
assert or to deny that the norms exist (and the validity of a norm is
its existence in a normative order). A conjunction of statements to
the effect that one norm exists and a second does not is not self-
contradictory; the conjunction is in every instance a contingent
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statement that is, it may be either true or false.
Although not demonstrating that the per analogiam argument
for systemic constraints on form is mistaken, Kelsen retracts the
argument in his recent papers on legal norms in the Essays and
denies that such constraints are possible. He readily embraces the
legal consequence of his new position, namely that in the case of
expressly conflicting norms, both are valid. He writes:
Conflicts between norms of morals and norms of law are famil-
iar to everybody. But there are also conflicts of norms within
one and the same legal order. . . as e.g. a conflict between two
statutes or conflicts between norms of one and the same stat-
ute. In all these cases both norms are valid, if there are no
special legal provisions solving this conflict. Since both norms
are valid, the one must be violated if the other is obeyed."
There is no analogy of the required sort between validity and truth,
and in the Essays Kelsen takes seriously the implications of this
fact.
That a norm is valid means that it is present. That a norm is
not valid means that it is absent. An invalid norm is one that
does not exist, and is thus not a norm. But a false statement is
also a statement; it is present as a statement, even if it is
false. 6
And, as a corollary, Kelsen notes that a norm has a temporal exist-
ence, while the truth or falsity of a statement is non-temporal.
A norm takes on validity, i.e., begins to be valid in time, and
goes out of validity, i.e., ceases to be valid in time or loses its
validity. A statement does not begin or cease to be true. If it is
true, it always has been and always will be. 7
These and other aspects of the validity of legal norms were entirely
familiar to Kelsen in other contexts, for example, in his illuminating
discussions of the temporal, spatial (or territorial), personal, and
material parameters of legal validity. 8 But only now, in the recent
papers on legal norms in the Essays, has Kelsen brought the impli-
cations of these aspects of validity to bear on his earlier efforts to
understand express conflicts between norms in terms of the analogy
of self-contradictory conjunctions of statements.
1S Kelsen, Law and Logic, in PHILOSOPHY AND CHRISTIANITY, note 5 supra, at 233.
14 Law and Logic, ESSAYS at 230.
57 Id.
11 See H. KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW chs. 2-3 (1952).
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CONCLUDING REMARK
The aim of the Pure Theory is, as Kelsen puts it, "to free legal
science from all extraneous elements."6 Having rejected the exist-
ence of systemic constraints on the content of legal norms in many
of his writings, and having now rejected systemic constraints on
form, Kelsen has in the recent Essays expurgated from legal science
the last extraneous elements of psychology, sociology, ethics, and
political theory-"impurities" that stood in the way of an under-
standing of law as a system of authorized acts of will. There is, to
be sure, no nodding agreement with Kelsen's views. But consensus
is not numbered among the desiderata of philosophical work. Origi-
nality and logical acumen are, and these Kelsen has in abundance.
We will continue to learn from him.
11 REINE RECITrSLEHRE § 1.
